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Facilitating and Regulating Private
Investment in a Developing Economy
S. K. Date-Bah*
I.

The International Context for National Facilitation and Regulation
of Private Investment

Transnational private investment in a globalized world has continued to be regulated and facilitated principally at the national level. The
international legal framework for private investment is still fairly rudimentary. There is no international investment regime equivalent to the
multilateral legal framework for trade that is established by the World
Trade Organization system of conventions, agreements, rules and understandings, built on the foundations of the GATT. However, there is an
increasing recognition by policymakers in many states that, as a result of
globalization and other changes in the international market place, regulatory approaches to private investment both at the national and international levels must be refashioned' to respond to some of the consequences of transnational economic activity. For instance, in relation to
financial services, there has been much talk of the need for a new international financial architecture. This need for international regulation is
met, to a small degree, by the activities of multilateral agencies such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the United
Nations. This paper presents a brief overview of aspects of the current
international multilateral legal framework for the facilitation and regulation of private investment.

*

LL.B (Ghana); LL.M (Yale); Ph.D (London). Fellow of the Ghana Academy of

Arts and Sciences. Special Adviser (Legal) and Head, Economic and Legal Section, Special Advisory Services Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, London. This paper draws

on material first presented in my Inaugural Lecture to the Ghana Academy of Arts and
Sciences in January 2002 in Accra.
1. See Christopher McCrudden, Regulation and Deregulation:An Introduction, in
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: POLICY AND PRACTICE IN THE UTILITIES AND FINANCIAL

SERVICES 3 (Christopher McCrudden ed., 1999).
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Regulation under the WTO system

The WTO system focuses principally on the regulation and facilitation of trade, in contradistinction from investment, unlike the Havana
Charter of 1948, which purported to establish the International Trade Organization. The Havana Charter aimed to facilitate and regulate both
trade and investment. However, the Havana Charter was never ratified,
never entered into force, and that part of it which was salvaged, namely
the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), dealt only with
trade. This is an artificially narrow focus since, in reality, trade and investment are indissolubly interlinked, and a global system of rules is
needed as much for investment as for trade. Indeed, in 1955, a GATT
review conference passed a Resolution on International Investment for
Economic Development which stressed the link between increased investment and the promotion of greater trade.
The new WTO system in place since January 1995, while dealing
principally with trade matters, contains some clusters of rules which have
an impact on the regulation of private investment. For instance, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) regulates certain aspects of
foreign direct investment. The GATS is one of many Agreements appended to the main treaty (The Marrakesh Agreement) establishing the
WTO, which regulate a range of matters relevant to establishing a rulesbased framework for the conduct of world trade. The GATS seeks to establish a basic framework for the international regulation of trade in services with the objective of opening up national markets for services to
increasing international competition. The GATS provides an umbrella
agreement which lays down general principles for the conduct of trade in
all service sectors. The GATS defines "trade in services" as the supply
of a service through cross-border trade, consumption abroad, commercial
presence abroad or presence of natural persons in a country other than
their own.2 The last two categories of supply imply that foreign direct
investment comes within the ambit of the Agreement since private commercial presence abroad and the movement of personnel abroad are often
manifestations of foreign investment.
The GATS applies the fundamental principle of the GATT, the
principle of the Most Favored Nation (MFN), to services. This means
that, in relation to services within its ambit, all trading partners from contracting States must be treated in an equal and non-discriminatory way.
Thus, irrespective of the extent of liberalization in any specific service
sector, foreign service providers are to be given equal opportunities.
2. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 48, art. I (1994).
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Furthermore, when a host contracting State avails itself of the provisions
under the Agreement to make a specific commitment in relation to a particular service sector, then it is obliged to give national treatment to foreign service suppliers in relation to that sector. In other words, foreign
providers of that service must be treated no less favorably than nationals.
The general umbrella Agreement is supplemented by the opportunity for member States to enter into such specific sectoral commitments.
For instance, a State may commit to giving foreign investors access to its
insurance industry without any requirement for local equity participation.
Once made, such a commitment is binding and cannot be retracted. Such
sectoral commitments obviously facilitate foreign investor provisioning
of the services with respect to which a host State has made a commitment. This effort to establish a level playing field between foreign and
domestic service providers through international regulation is an illustration of one of the pockets of rules which exist at the international level to
facilitate and regulate private investment. Sectoral commitments by host
States in relation to particular service sectors are therefore emerging as
an internationally binding technique for the promotion of foreign investment.
It has to be recognized, however, that the GATS is of limited relevance as an instrument of multilateral investment regulation. It is not an
instrument of investment regulation as such, but rather addresses investment as one of the ways for traders to gain access to export markets. It is
thus an instrument of trade policy with an impact on the investment
process. Its impact relates to the post-investment phase, in that it provides for rules governing the treatment of foreign service providers who
have established a commercial presence in the jurisdiction of a contracting Member State. The rules it provides for include, for instance, those
on domestic regulation (ensuring that regulation of services in a host
country's jurisdiction is fair and objective) and on transparency (requiring host governments to publish all relevant laws and regulations and to
establish enquiry points to provide specific information to other member
States on all service sectors).
Another agreement appended to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation is the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This Agreement also
contains a cluster of multilateral rules relevant to host country treatment
of foreign investors, through its provisions on minimum standards for the
protection of intellectual property. The aim of the TRIPS Agreement is
to prevent unfair competition in countries which afford little or no protection for intellectual property, hence preventing piracy and counterfeiting. The TRIPS Agreement is based on three key principles:
(a) Minimum standards:
the provisions contained in the
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Agreement for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights are minima and any country may provide greater protection.
(b) National treatment: this principle, which lies at the heart of
the Paris 3 and Berne 4 Conventions requires that countries
protect nationals of other countries by treating them no less
favorably than they treat their own nationals.
(c) (c )Most Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment: The MFN
standard requires the non-discriminatory treatment of nationals of all WTO States on an equal basis. MFN is one of
the fundamental principles of the GATT system, which the
WTO has inherited, and in the TRIPS Agreement, is expressed as follows:
With regard to the protection of intellectual property, any
advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by a
Member to the nationals of any other country shall be acunconditionally to the nationals
corded immediately and
5
of all other Members.
Thus the standard of treatment to which a national of a WTO State
is entitled must not be lower than that to which the national of any other
WTO State is entitled. This implies that if a WTO State enters into a bilateral treaty on intellectual property with another WTO State which
raises the level of protection of intellectual property rights available to
their nationals in their respective national jurisdictions, this higher level
of protection becomes automatically available to the nationals of all other
WTO States.
A current issue relating to TRIPS has been the insistence by many
developing countries that the minimum standard of protection relating to
the patent rights of pharmaceutical companies should be relaxed in the
interest of their public health needs. A key demand of the developing
countries at the Fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha in November,
2001, was for clarification of what governments can do under the TRIPS
Agreement by way of compulsory licensing or parallel imports of patented drugs in order to ensure access to life-saving drugs for the poor.
Compulsory licensing enables the making of a drug locally in a host
State without the consent of the patent owner. Parallel importing refers
3. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883,
T.I.A.S. 6923, 7727, 21 U.S.T. 1583.
4. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Jan. 1, 1951,
T.I.A.S. 3324, 6 U.S.T. 2731.
5. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, 33 I.L.M. 84, art. IV (1994).
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to the practice whereby drugs which are a cheaper in one country are imported into another without the patent owner's approval. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health granted the developing countries the clarification they sought. It was made clear that the
TRIPS Agreement was to be interpreted as supportive of the following
WTO member State rights: protection of public health and, in particular,
promotion of access to medicines for all; and granting of compulsory licenses; and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.6
In sum, the TRIPS Agreement also provides a cluster of multilateral
rules which beneficially regulate foreign and domestic investors, but
which were not formulated primarily as rules for the regulation of investments. Rather, the rules were conceived of as leveling the playing
field for international trade. Similar clusters of rules are found in the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) which prohibits restrictive requirements on local content and trade-balancing.
The conclusion to be drawn regarding the regulation of investment
available under the WTO regime is that it is fragmentary and its impact
on the investment process is incidental rather than frontal.
B. Regulation under the World Bank System
There are two legally binding Conventions concluded under the
auspices of the World Bank Group which provide multilateral rules on
private investment, but each has a rather narrow focus. Therefore, they
do not provide a comprehensive framework of multilateral rules for investment in the way that the WTO system provides for trade. These two
Conventions are the 1965 Convention on the Settlement of Investment
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID) and the
1985 Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency (MIGA). However, the World Bank instrument with the most
comprehensive scope is not even a binding legal instrument, but rather,
comprises guidelines which it has commended to its Member States.
This document, the Legal Frameworkfor the Treatment of Foreign Investment,7 was attached to a Report to the Development Committee of
the World Bank. The Committee agreed in a meeting in September,
1992, to recommend the guidelines contained in it to all Member States.
The World Bank Guidelines focus on the protection and the stan6. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement & Public
Health, Fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar,
4-5 (adopted Nov. 14, 2001)
available at http://www.wto.org (last visited May 17, 2003) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
7. Legal Framework for the Treatment of Foreign Investment, Nov. 1992, 31
I.L.M. 1363.
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dards of treatment owed to the foreign investor by host States. This focus is in contrast to the earlier work done by the United Nations Centre
on Transnational Corporation (UNCTC) culminating in the UNCTC
Draft Code, which was never adopted. The focus of the Draft Code was
on the obligations of multinational corporations to host States.
The abandoned UNCTC Draft Code arose out of developing countries' concerns about the power of multinational corporations and the
need for host States to be strengthened in their relations with these corporations. Under the auspices of the UNCTC, a working group produced a
draft Code after several meetings, but the representatives of the developed States in the group differed from the representatives of the developing countries on many important issues. Efforts stretching over a decade
to resolve these differences proved fruitless and no consensus was ever
reached. However, the process of attempting to reach a consensus on the
Draft Code revealed the extent of the differences between the capitalexporting countries and the capital-importing countries.
C. Explanationfor Absence of a MultilateralRegulatory Framework
The reason for the absence of a multilaterally agreed legal framework for the regulation of private investment is not difficult to discern.
States have failed to agree on substantive principles and standards on this
issue. States have had conflicting views on their rights and obligations
and those of private investors. The disagreements have been between the
North and the South and between the East and the West. This has bedevilled all efforts to reach a comprehensive multilateral agreement on the
regulation and facilitation of private investment. The disagreements relate to differing interpretations of the customary public international law
rules relating to State responsibility for injury to aliens and to their property. According to the traditional interpretation of these rules, a host
State is obligated to observe an international minimum standard in the
treatment of aliens and their property. The duty to comply with this international standard is not necessarily discharged by according to aliens
the same standard of treatment as nationals. If the national standard falls
below the minimum standard, the delinquent State may attract liability
under public international law. While most developing countries accept
that customary public international law limits the freedom of action of
host States in their treatment of aliens and their property, the developing
countries interpret the content of the relevant rules differently. Some
public international law writers from developing countries have disputed
whether the classical rules on State responsibility for the treatment of
aliens and their property are part of contemporary customary interna-
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tional law, 8 since their universality has been denied by some authoritative
writers. The Ghanaian lawyer, Dr. S.K.B. Asante, concludes, after reviewing the relevant legal materials, that:
The traditional concept of State responsibility originally fashioned by
the Western world as a body of civilised and liberal international
standards for the protection of individual aliens subsequently came
under attack when it was perceived as either inequitable or inadequate for the purposes of addressing the concerns of an enlarged international community which lacked homogeneity as to political,
economic or developmental values and goals. While it cannot be unequivocally asserted that a new doctrine of State responsibility now
commands universal support, it is equally clear that the traditional
concept no longer prevails. The international legal scene is both
9 fluid
and uncertain, and calls for the formulation of new standards.
D. BilateralInvestment Treaties
It is in this context of uncertainty regarding the customary public international law rules on the treatment of foreign investment that many
capital-exporting States have sought greater certainty through the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with capital-importing States.
Through BITs, (the first of which was concluded in 1959 between West
Germany and Pakistan), the uncertainty that exists at customary international law on the issue of the standard of treatment to be accorded to foreign investors by host States can be addressed. UNCTAD estimates that
over 1800 of these BITs have been concluded to date, (rising from less
than four hundred at the end of the 1980s).1° They are, accordingly, a
significant source of the international law relating to the treatment of private investment. However, they are sources of conventional international law and not necessarily of general customary international law.
Because of the great number of them, BITs are currently more significant in the protection of foreign investments than the general rules of
customary international law. Although initially concluded between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries at the request of the capitalexporting country, this pattern has changed since the 1900s, and more
developing countries and countries in transition have begun to sign treaties among themselves. 1
8.
9.

M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 120 (1994).
S.K.B. Asante, International Law and Foreign Investment: A Reappraisal,37

INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 588, 626 (1988).
10. Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-1999, at 1, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2
(2000) availableat http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poiteiiad2.en.pdf (last visited Oct. 15,
2003).
11.

Id. at 2.

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

E.

[Vol. 22:1

Towards Fairand BalancedLegally Binding MultilaterallyAgreed
Standards Governing the Conduct of Host States and Foreign
Investors in Relation to ForeignInvestments

It is clear, from what I have outlined concerning the international
legal framework for private investment across national boundaries, that a
multilaterally agreed framework is lacking. This fact is perceived in
many quarters as an impediment to increased transnational private investment flows and has led to the creation of bilateral investment treaties
between capital-exporting and capital-importing States. However, the
bargaining position of capital-importing States in relation to such bilateral treaties is weak. This has led to developing countries' acceptance of
treaty obligations in spite of the fact that they firmly reject these obligations as not being part of customary international law. A multilateral negotiating forum would be better suited to paying attention to the views of
developing countries. Thus, in spite of the failure of the UNCTC to
come up with a legally binding multilateral instrument, it would be in the
interest of the developing countries to make another effort to achieve an
agreed multilateral regulatory and facilitating framework for transnational private investment.
A new multilateral instrument should improve upon previous failed
attempts, including the Draft UNCTC Code of Conduct and the OECD's
draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment ("MAI"). The instrument
must accommodate both the right of host countries to regulate private investments on their territory and the investors' claims for protection of
their investments.
The advantage of a multilateral instrument would be the establishment of greater certainty regarding the legal rights and responsibilities of
investors and host States and, therefore, the reduction of risks perceived
by foreign investors to attach to their investments. A balanced multilateral instrument would also increase trust between host States and foreign
investors.
An important issue is the forum within which such a multilateral investment instrument should be negotiated. Some WTO members, both
developed and developing, have advocated that the WTO be the forum
for such negotiations. At the Fourth Ministerial Conference of the WTO
in Doha from November 9-14, 2001, these WTO members advocated the
start of negotiations for a WTO Agreement on foreign direct investment,
as part of the next round of trade talks. They have contended that the existing regime of BITs is confusing and complicated and thus not conducive to increased investment flows. However, many developing countries have shown no enthusiasm for this proposal. The developing
countries opposed to this proposal prefer instead that the WTO Working
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Group established in 1997 continue to study the relationship between international trade and investment, and its implications for economic
growth and development. They fear that any multilateral agreement is
likely to add to their obligations. The caution of the developing countries probably flows from their perception that the balance of advantage
from the Uruguay Round of trade talks was not in their favor.
Their concerns must be addressed sufficiently in the next round of
trade talks. At Doha, a compromise was struck whereby the members of
the WTO agreed to negotiations on a "multilateral framework to secure
transparent, stable and predictable conditions for long-term cross-border
investment, particularly foreign direct investment."1 2 However, such negotiations are to begin only after the Fifth Ministerial Conference in two
years and on the basis of a decision to be taken by "explicit consensus" at
that Session on the modalities of the negotiations. This implies, under
the WTO's decision-making rules, that, at the Fifth Ministerial Conference, any one State can, in theory, block further work on the proposed
multilateral instrument. In the meantime, in the period before the Fifth
Ministerial Conference, the WTO Working Group on the Relationship
Between Trade and Investment is to continue with its task of study and
analysis.
It would thus appear that there is a good chance that the WTO may
be the forum for the settling of multilateral rules on private investment
across national borders. The Doha Declaration explicitly states that:
"Any framework should reflect in a balanced manner the interests of
home and host countries, and take due account of the development policies and objectives of' host
governments as well as their right to regulate
3
in the public interest."'
II.

National Law Dimensions of Facilitation and Regulation

A.

Government as Facilitator: The Role of Law

1. Provision of an Adequate Legal Infrastructure for the Private
Sector
Governments provide and maintain the legal systems which are the
necessary framework for the making of private investment decisions.
Those parts of a legal system needed by private enterprises for the making of their private investments may be referred to as the legal infrastructure of private investment. It behooves governments to monitor and assess the continued adequacy of their legal infrastructure for private
12.
13.

Doha Declaration, supra note 6, at 20.
id. at 22.
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investment. In the eighties and nineties, with the wave of privatizations
in many countries and particularly in the so-called transition (socialist to
market) economies, governments began to carry out overviews of their
legal systems to determine which aspects needed reform or adaptation to
meet the needs of the newer, more market-oriented economies. A few
such diagnostic studies have been done for African States. I was fortunate to be the leader of a Commonwealth Secretariat team which, from
1995 to 1996, carried out a diagnostic survey of Ghanaian laws affecting
private sector development.
Among the team's recommendations were as follows:
1. Before private capital is invited to invest in the provision of those services previously provided by Government, there should be a thorough review of the law applicable to each of the sectors in which Government
has had a monopoly, and an appropriate regulatory
framework should be put in place for such services,
sector by sector.
2. The law on insolvency must be enacted for Ghana.
3. There should be a strengthening of transparency in the
exercise of discretionary authority relating to the authorizations required for private enterprise activities.
4. Steps should be taken to expedite the process for the
delivery of judicial decisions in order to remove the
perception among business people that the judicial
process in Ghana is unduly dilatory.
This sampling of the recommendations of the Commonwealth Secretariat team is recited here to illustrate the infrastructural role of law in
relation to private investment. All of the recommendations mentioned
above were intended to result in the law serving as a better instrument for
enabling private entrepreneurs to invest. For instance, private investors
cannot invest in privatized public utilities without an adequate enabling
and regulatory framework. Again, the absence of any law on individual
insolvency in Ghana is an impediment to private investment. Indeed, as
far back as 1961, this was recognised in the Report of the Commissioners
Appointed to Enquire into the Insolvency Law of Ghana which affirmed
that:
The evidence we have received leaves us in no doubt that insolvency
legislation is badly needed and, if introduced, would be widely welcomed. With a unanimity that has at times surprised us, witnesses
have affirmed that the present law of debtor and creditor is gravely
deficient and is unduly weighted in favor of the debtor. Moreover, it
now seems to be generally realized that, by restricting the amount of
credit that is given, the lack of effective machinery for the settlement
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of debts and of a modem insolvency law is proving an increasingly
14
serious handicap to the economic development of the country.
Finally, the provision of an effective, efficient, and expeditious
process for the judicial resolution of business disputes is an essential feature of the State's role in facilitating private investment.
2. National investment codes as a facilitating mechanism
Many host States, which want to facilitate the entry of private foreign investment into their economy, have adopted foreign investment
codes, that is to say, national legislation aimed at reassuring foreign investors of the security of their investment and which is also intended to
encourage them to invest in that particular jurisdiction. Of course, customary international law recognizes the authority of host States to regulate the admission of foreign investment into their territory and to apply
national law to it, subject to any applicable international law. The older
foreign investment codes tended to be quite regulatory and had a screening function. With the increased competition for foreign capital in more
recent times, investment codes have been liberalized and have become
more facilitating than regulatory. Indeed, in one example of these modem statutes, the Namibian Foreign Investment Act, no screening mechanism exists. Foreign investors have a right to invest in Namibia without
any need for administrative authorization. It is only if the investor seeks
certain fiscal incentives and other benefits on offer that the investor need
apply to the Namibian Investment Centre. Similarly, the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act of 1994 5 allows foreign investors to invest
in all sectors of the Ghanaian economy, other than the mining and petroleum sectors, without any prior approval by the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC). Foreign investors only need to register with the
GIPC information on the actual minimum capital they have invested in
their enterprises.
B. Government as Regulator: The Role ofLaw
The part that law plays in a developing State's role as regulator is
best understood through illustrations from some of the areas of established regulatory practice. Prominent among these areas are the regulation of banking and other financial services, the regulation of public utilities, the regulation of the securities market, and the regulation of anticompetitive behavior.
14. Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Insolvency Law of
Ghana, 16.
15. Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, 1994 (Act 478) available at
http://www.gipc.org.gh/ (last visited May 17, 2003).
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1. Regulating Public Utilities
In the wake of the widespread privatizations of the 1980s and
1990s, the responsibility of the State to regulate privatized public utilities
has a special significance. While a firm with a natural monopoly is in
public ownership, the public interest is protected through the Government's control of its corporate policies. Accordingly, any private corporation's entrepreneurial inclination to abuse its monopoly can be checked
by the government. When the enterprise has been privatized, it becomes
necessary for the government to adopt measures such as the regulation of
output prices and the deployment of enforcement mechanisms for obligations relating to the coverage and quality of the services provided and the
investment performance of the service provider. The law must provide
for an appropriate framework within which such measures can be fashioned and implemented. Most governments aim to achieve fairness for
both their consumers and their public utility service providers and to
promote efficiency in the provision of the service concerned. Fairness to
consumers implies arrangements which deliver to them fair prices and a
good quality of service. Efficiency implies giving the service providers
an opportunity to earn a return on their investment that is sufficient to
compel them to invest in the technology, capital equipment, and skilled
human resources needed for an efficient operation.
These twin objectives of fairness and efficiency lead to different
balances of interests in different national legislation on the regulation of
public utilities. One view of the balance of interests in this area is to be
found in the Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act, 1997 (Act 538)
of Ghana. Section 16(2) of this Act provides that the Commission is to
prepare and provide to public utilities guidelines on rates to be charged
by the public utilities for their services. Section 16(3) states that:
In preparing the guidelines, the Commission shall take into account:
(a) consumer interest;
(b) investor interest;
(c) the cost of production of the service; and
(d) assurance of the financial integrity of the public
utility. 16
This Ghanaian statute thus eschews a hierarchy, or prioritization, of
the interests to be taken into account.
This approach may be criticized as too ambivalent. It may be desirable in many jurisdictions for the relevant legislation to state what interest should be accorded primacy. Is primacy to be accorded to ensuring
that the producer is able to finance the provision and expansion of the
service, or is it to be given to protecting the interest of the consumer?
16.

Public Utilities Regulatory Commission Act, 1997 (Act 538), § 16(3).
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The governments of countries at different stages of development may respond differently to this issue. A host government from a developing
country may, for instance, determine that in the medium term it will accord primacy to providing an incentive to producers to invest in its privatized utilities in order expand the coverage and quality of the service.
However, for a developed country with a mature utilities sector, emphasis on protecting consumer interests, rather than expanding the system,
may be a preferable policy option. Each government must make its policy choice in the light of its perception of national need.
Monopoly providers of public utility services in all countries are
subject to some form of regulation. The regulation may be carried out
from within the mainstream machinery of the Government, or it may be
separated from Government and devolved to an agency with a defined
degree of autonomy. Such independence in the regulator has come to be
regarded as useful for the successful functioning of the regulatory system. Where such independence is provided for, the respective roles of
Ministers and regulators is an important matter to be settled in the interest of predictability and transparency of the regulatory regime. The establishment of a credible, independent regulator has been a common feature of the privatization of public utilities in Europe, Latin America, and
increasingly, Asia. Independence for regulators is essential for giving
confidence to private investors in the utilities sector that the terms governing their investment will not be arbitrarily changed to their disadvantage. The insulation of the economic regulation of public utilities from
ad hoc political involvement reduces regulatory risks for private investors and thus, the cost of capital. Private investors are likely to increase
the rate of return they require on their investment if the regulatory context is uncertain. At the same time, an independent regulator can provide
reassurance to consumers that their interests will be protected.
The legal and institutional framework for regulating particular privatized utilities will depend on the kind of regulation chosen by the Government. For instance, rate of return regulation of a privatized public utility
has ordinarily, in many jurisdictions, implied the establishment of a tribunal
to serve as a forum for proceedings to determine the enterprise's costs,
revenues, and rate of return. Designing the institutional framework for
regulating privately-owned public utility companies in a particular jurisdiction therefore involves a series of related choices.
2. Regulating Financial Services
The twin objectives of most national financial regulatory authorities
are monetary and financial stability. To achieve these twin objectives,
the legal system must give these authorities adequate legal powers to
monitor the performance of banks and non-bank financial institutions
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and to take measures to prevent potential disturbances to the financial
and monetary system.
The broad policy objectives of formulating a regulatory framework
for financial services may be identified as: stability, efficiency and fairness. Stability is an important prerequisite for the smooth functioning of
the whole financial sector since this is required to boost the confidence of
depositors and other investors, whose trust is critical for the functioning
of the financial system. The confidence of the public that financial institutions are safe and well supervised by a credible regulator is crucial.
The objective of stability implies the need for rules on prudential control
of financial institutions. Among such rules are those, for instance, on
capital adequacy and those permitting rigorous supervision of deposittaking institutions. The regulatory framework also must promote the efficient operation of financial institutions, which usually implies allowing
competition in the provision of their services. Finally, the regulatory
framework must promote fairness to users of the financial market. These
objectives have informed the formulation of legislation on banking and
non-bank financial institutions, usually with a central bank or a monetary
authority at the apex of the regulatory regime.
Above the national regulatory system are international institutions
which formulate international standards for regulatory and supervisory
structures over financial services. For instance, in relation to banking
supervision, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision of the Bank
for International Settlements has issued Core Principles for Effective
Banking Supervision, which central banks and other apex regulators are
expected to enforce. Also, in relation to money laundering, the Financial
Action Task Force in Paris has promulgated its Forty Recommendations
which are used as a benchmark by the international community for assessing the adequacy of national regulatory regimes in combating money
laundering.
These remarks relating to the regulation of financial services are
made in order to illustrate the role that law needs to play in order to deliver the macro-economic stability that private investors need in order to
make their investments. Ghana, for instance, has in place legislation on
central banking, banking, non-bank financial institutions, and insurance.
There is no need to consider the mechanics of the regulatory regime embodied in them, except to observe that they all resort to licensing control
as a regulatory technique both to control market entry and as leverage in
enforcing standards of performance and probity in the industry. (In other
words, market entry is not permitted without a license from the appropriate authority and serious misfeasance can lead to a license being withdrawn.) The licensing control is complemented with authority for public
officials to engage in active supervision of the activities of financial ser-
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vices providers. It is enough here to note that the relevant pieces of legislation do provide a regulatory regime and that this provision is an important support for private investment.
3. Regulating Anti-Competitive Behavior
Competition legislation is a further illustration of the regulatory role
that law must play in order to enable private enterprise to thrive. Competition law responds to the risk that, when markets are liberalized, private
enterprises operating in the "free markets" may seek to set up barriers to
competition in the form of cartels or restrictive agreements or engage in
anti-competitive conduct. Competition policy and law are therefore
meant to underpin the measures of economic liberalization which many
developing countries have introduced. Indeed competition policy and
law should lie at the heart of any market economy. When markets fail to
work competitively, the general public suffers detriment. Competition
legislation provides the means for government to intervene to prevent
anti-competitive conduct or to change non-competitive market structures.
With the increasing adoption of economic liberalization policies in
developing countries, several African countries have enacted competition
laws. These include: Algeria, Tunisia, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon. Namibia is actively considering a proposed competition statute and South Africa has recently
amended its existing competition law. Ghana, however, has no competition statute. The absence of a competition statute in States such as
Ghana represents a glaring regulatory gap.
Some States have been endeavoring to use the WTO to obligate all
States to plug the kind of regulatory gap that exists in Ghana. However,
many developing countries are suffering from an overload of regulatory
reform and are resisting pressure to carry out such reform within deadlines set by the WTO. In the Doha Ministerial Declaration of November,
2001, a compromise was struck between the developing countries opposed to the inclusion of competition policy in the next round of trade
talks and European Union countries, which had been pressing for its inclusion. It was agreed that a decision, "by explicit consensus," was to be
taken at the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the modalities
of negotiations for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution
of competition policy to international trade and development.
The WTO has a Working Group on the Interaction between Trade
and Competition Policy. The Group's goal is to clarify the principles of
competition policy to be applied nationally. Currently, before the Fifth
Session, the Working Group is clarifying:
core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for
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voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity
building. Full account shall be taken of the needs of developing and
least-developed country17 participants and appropriate flexibility provided to address them.

III.

Conclusion

The instrumental role of law in relation to private investment is one
that governments of developing countries must be reminded of to ensure
that they give due attention to it. An appreciation of this role should lead
such governments to engage in law reform to enable their domestic legal
system to better perform its role of facilitating and regulating private investment. Law reform alone is, of course, not a sufficient condition for
attracting private capital into a particular economy. Other factors, such
as good governance and macro-economic stability, are also taken into
account by investors. Law reform to fashion a legal infrastructure that
supports private investment is, however, a necessary condition for the
healthy development of the private sector in most jurisdictions.

17. World Trade Organization, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade
and Competition Policy, available at
http://www.wto.org/English/tratope/compe/compe.htm (last visited May 17, 2003).

